When Engagement Is (Almost) Marriage: A Preliminary Economic Analysis of the Law of Moses on Betrothal

Authors

Nancy Wu (EDLE (University of Hamburg))

Abstract

The familial system bases its foundation on marriage, which has existed as a legal and economic institution since ancient times. Many communities worldwide still initiate marriage through an engagement period, which modern legal systems have incorporated into their civil codes. Among the ancient Near Eastern legal traditions and records, however, Biblical Israel was distinctive: it was the first culture to give engagement (*betrothal*) an official written legal status; the imposed financial obligations and criminal sanctions that turned this social tradition into a legally binding act with much weight.

Two aspects of this distinctiveness deserve particular emphasis. The Mosaic provisions present an extensive set of rules because they establish a complete system for betrothal initiation and dissolution and all related legal and economic effects. Second, the Israelite framework is the first and only among the Ancient Near Eastern traditions to ground the legal construct of betrothal explicitly in theology. This theological foundation endowed the institution with a form of legality and legitimacy that other Ancient Near Eastern systems did not develop, thus establishing betrothal as part of a comprehensive religious-legal framework.

The research aims to perform an initial economic and legal assessment of Mosaic betrothal rules by examining Pentateuch and Mishnah sections that apply to this topic. The study examines how these laws impact transaction costs, together with incentive systems and risk allocation patterns throughout the entire process from before marriage until after dispute resolution. A basic numerical model demonstrates how strict betrothal rules function as an efficient system because they reduce the costs of resolving disputes through informal means while safeguarding the bride and motivating both partners to build their household. The efficiency gains reach their peak when strict enforcement rules are in place and the less powerful party receives substantial social consequences.