Abstract
Forest governance is often at the root of multiple-level conflicts, which involve a diverse array of costs and risks in terms of both efficiency and justice. However, if properly managed, conflicts can be a positive force for institutional change and innovation, allowing for the coordination of multiple cross-scale interests and the formation of new social and power relationships. This study uses game theory modelling to investigate the processes leading to the historical agreement over the Great Bear Rainforest after decades of contestation among various groups. The paper moves from the standard game theory approach by applying the subjective games model (Aoki, 2001; Cecchini Manara and Sacconi, 2019) to the ex-ante phase, namely changing interactions between various stakeholders and transformation of conflict into dialogue for an agreement and cooperation. The model allows an interpretation of the crucial role of mobilization and boycotting in changing incentives. Indeed, by applying this model, boycotting and mobilization can be seen as changing the most powerful actors’ framing of the game, from a game where cooperation has no mutually beneficial outcomes and unilateral defection is possible and advantageous, to one where this strategy is less prominent, and cooperation becomes feasible.