Abstract
Citizens exert networked coordinated action for a variety of reasons, among which economic and political ones. We construct on the O-group versus P-group hypothesis (Knack, 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1997) and investigate the relationship between networks and the rule of law. Distributional coalitions à la Olson (1982) pursue (small) group interests which often go to the detriment of a larger group and the public good. P-groups are in line with Putnam’s (1993a) civic associations that promote social capital. While O-groups can be expected to undermine the rule of law, P-groups can promote it asking for greater transparency and accountability of the governing bodies. We put the relationship between networks and the rule of law into a system or relations in which values, social norms and formal institutions mediate and forward causal pathways. We organize a comprehensive interdisciplinary literature review along each single link, and reconstruct the current state-of-the-art regarding the functioning of the system we conceptualize.