Abstract
THIS PAPER ANALYSES THE ITALIAN PUBLIC PROCUREMENTS’ LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER THE LENS OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS THEORY. IN PARTICULAR, IT ADDRESSES THE RULES THAT GOVERN THE DECISION ON WHETHER TO DELIVER SERVICES, GOODS OR WORKS DIRECTLY (IN-HOUSE) OR RESORTING TO THE MARKET (OUTSOURCING).
THESE RULES (ALSO IN THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION) APPEAR TO BE INSPIRED BY A FAVOUR FOR OUTSOURCING, RELEGATING THE IN-HOUSE MODEL TO MARGINAL AND EXCEPTIONAL CASES. INDEED, THE CHOICE FOR IN-HOUSE PROVISION MUST BE EXPRESSLY MOTIVATED BY EVIDENCE THAT IT ENTAILS LOWER COSTS THAN COMPARABLE MARKET SOLUTIONS.
WE ARGUE, BY APPLYING THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS (AND SPECIFICALLY THE MODEL BY HART/SHLEIFER/VISHNY (1997)), THAT THIS APPROACH IS NARROW-MINDED INASMUCH IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ROLE OF CONTRACTUAL INCOMPLETENESS.
BY CONSEQUENCE, FIRSTLY WE WILL CRITICALLY ASSESS THE ITALIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND, SECONDLY, WE PUT FORWARD SOME SUGGESTIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT ITS IMPROVEMENT.
THESE RULES (ALSO IN THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION) APPEAR TO BE INSPIRED BY A FAVOUR FOR OUTSOURCING, RELEGATING THE IN-HOUSE MODEL TO MARGINAL AND EXCEPTIONAL CASES. INDEED, THE CHOICE FOR IN-HOUSE PROVISION MUST BE EXPRESSLY MOTIVATED BY EVIDENCE THAT IT ENTAILS LOWER COSTS THAN COMPARABLE MARKET SOLUTIONS.
WE ARGUE, BY APPLYING THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS (AND SPECIFICALLY THE MODEL BY HART/SHLEIFER/VISHNY (1997)), THAT THIS APPROACH IS NARROW-MINDED INASMUCH IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ROLE OF CONTRACTUAL INCOMPLETENESS.
BY CONSEQUENCE, FIRSTLY WE WILL CRITICALLY ASSESS THE ITALIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND, SECONDLY, WE PUT FORWARD SOME SUGGESTIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT ITS IMPROVEMENT.