Abstract
This paper investigates the phenomenon of constitutional breakdown through
the lens of economic analysis. Moving beyond the traditional legal interpretation
of constitutional rupture as a formal or, otherwise, political event, we conceptu
alize it as a strategic shift in incentives and institutional equilibrium. When the
actors within a political system perceive that compliance with constitutional norms
no longer maximizes their expected payoffs, the Constitution ceases to serve as a
binding coordination device. We propose that constitutional breakdown can be
modeled as a rational exit from an implicit contract, triggered when the enforce
ment mechanisms collapse or lose legitimacy. The analysis combines insights from
contract theory, institutional economics, and public law, aiming to offer a unified
framework to understand why and when constitutions fail.
the lens of economic analysis. Moving beyond the traditional legal interpretation
of constitutional rupture as a formal or, otherwise, political event, we conceptu
alize it as a strategic shift in incentives and institutional equilibrium. When the
actors within a political system perceive that compliance with constitutional norms
no longer maximizes their expected payoffs, the Constitution ceases to serve as a
binding coordination device. We propose that constitutional breakdown can be
modeled as a rational exit from an implicit contract, triggered when the enforce
ment mechanisms collapse or lose legitimacy. The analysis combines insights from
contract theory, institutional economics, and public law, aiming to offer a unified
framework to understand why and when constitutions fail.