SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DI DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA
Douglas Sabino (Federal University of Minas Gerais)
Fabiano Lara (Federal University of Minas Gerais)
Elisa Sarto (Federal University of Minas Gerais)
Abstract
The Brazilian Antitrust Law created the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), which is responsible for investigating and applying sanctions for acts that violate the economic order and for supervising acts of economic concentration. Game theory focuses on the actions of decision-makers who are aware that their decisions affect each other. The proposed article aims to analyse the legal framework of the Leniency Programme implemented by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense of Brazil (CADE) using the tools provided by game theory, in particular sequential games with perfect information. In view of the two scenarios presented, it was first observed that the benefits provided by the current Brazilian leniency programme are not sufficient for a potential participant in a cartel to decide to propose a leniency agreement. Otherwise, in a second moment, when we introduced the granting of immunity to the applicant in relation to civil damages caused by the practice of the cartel, it was observed that with the addition of this benefit, the Brazilian Antitrust Leniency Programme becomes an important instrument of dissuasion and combat of the practice of cartels.