SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DI DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA
Fabio Monteforte (University of Messina)
Maurizio Lisciandra (LUMSA)
Antonio Miralles Asensio (University of Messina)
The political corruption process is a time-consuming and costly process, characterised by heterogeneities on both sides of the corruption trade mechanism as well as by information imperfections. This article focuses on those particular aspects of political corruption by studying a dynamic model of corruption persistence and pervasiveness applying search and matching ideas into a political corruption framework. The model is used to study the dynamic effect of different policies, aimed at reducing the extent of corruption over time, on corruption pervasiveness and the amount of the equilibrium bribe. The model predicts that corruption pervasiveness decreases in response to improvements in detection efficiency, transparency and penalties from detection. The amount of the bribe increases the higher the bribee’s bargaining power or the higher the penalties from detection.