Fidelio: not opening the doors to rebellious t̶e̶e̶n̶s̶ parliamentarians

Umberto Nizza (University of Verona)

Abstract

In politics, the phenomenon of sharpshooting can be common. The treason within the ranks, with renegades voting against the political agenda of their own party, is quite common in Italy, along with widespread practice of party hopping. Using a dataset of 34.630 votes in the Italian Chamber of the Deputies between 2008 and 2013, we test whether more loyal members of the parliament are more or less inclined to rebel votes in floor voting sessions. Using historical insights to instrument transformistic tendencies among parliamentarians, the manuscript uncovers the fact that parliamentarians crossing the floor are much more rebellious than their peers. Policy-making perspectives and implications are then suggested.

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