Società Italiana di Diritto ed Economia, SIDE - ISLE 2015 - 11TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

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Condemning Corruption while Condoning Inefficiency: An Experimental Investigation into Voting Behavior
Sergio Mittlaender Leme de Souza

Last modified: 2015-12-05

Abstract


This article reports results from an economic experiment that investigates to what extent voters punish corruption and waste in elections. While both are responsible for a loss of welfare for voters, they are not necessarily perceived as equally immoral. The empirical literature in political agency has not yet dealt with these two dimensions that determine voters’ choices. Our results suggest that morality and norms are indeed crucial for a superior voting equilibrium in systems with heterogeneous politicians, and that self-interest alone leads to the survival and perpetuation of waste and social losses.

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